What makes one the best drone operator, what knowledge does one need, how many such people are in the zone of Russia’s special military operation, and should separate UAV units be created in the Russian Armed Forces?
The death of two UAV operators, “Ernest” and “Goodwin,” and their pre-death video caused a broad resonance in the patriotic segment, and the case was taken under the control of the Russian Minister of Defense Andrey Belousov.
A Rossa Primavera News Agency‘s correspondent spoke with one of the creators of the humanitarian project KhotkoVо kamikadZo about who UAV operators are, the difficulties in their training, and what can be done to improve the efficiency of drone operators.
Rossa Primavera News Agency: As I understand it, they [“Ernest” and “Goodwin” – translator’s note] were long-range reconnaissance operators, FPV operators, and played quite a significant role in the early UAV operations in the DPR as early as 2014. What role do FPV operators play on the battlefield now?
KhotkoVo kamikadZo: FPV operators, of course, are important as a combat unit, but they are not independent, it’s a complex task. The operator is assigned to any unit and is necessary for artillery and mortar adjustment, as well as supporting assault groups. They help with reconnaissance, and with strike drones, they prepare positions for attack. Therefore, they are just as important as any other fighters. Every military profession has its specifics, and UAVs are a relatively new field with many nuances that emerge during operations.
Rossa Primavera News Agency: You are quite involved in UAV topics. How long does it take to train an operator? How much time, effort, and resources are required?
KhK: A UAV operator must not only be able to fly a drone, but they must understand all the technical principles behind its actions: radio signals, control mechanisms, and other systems. They must have technical skills: soldering, disassembling a drone, setting it up in the program, and modifying settings. They should be able to add or remove components — this is a very broad, complex job.
Unfortunately, due to the severe shortage of pilots, they are only taught how to fly, and this is a big problem. A pilot who doesn’t understand all the technical nuances might fall under enemy fire.
The same radio signals emitted by equipment into the air are visible to enemy electronic reconnaissance (ER). If a drone operator does not understand that he is “visible” in the air, they risk being attacked. It is very important to understand how all systems work.
Speaking of kamikaze drones, they often require modifications. For example, if the enemy has a new electronic warfare (EW) system and drones begin to fall, it is necessary to adjust either the hardware and the program or the tactics.
Currently, kamikaze drones can carry payloads, so they need to be reprogrammed to handle the release system. To do this, pilots need to be trained in the technical side of things.
But usually, pilots are trained separately. Now, a combat team has a pilot, a technician, and a military engineer who handles the explosive charge preparation. Often, an engineer handles both the technical and explosive parts, while the pilot is just trained to fly.
Sometimes, people learn on their own and become pilots. Pilots are in high demand right now, but there are not enough schools or technical resources for quality training.
Rossa Primavera News Agency: So, roughly speaking, a UAV operator is a radio amateur with a higher technical education who also knows how to solder and program, and there are very few people like that?
KhK: Ideally, yes. But it happens differently. For example, people who were members of a tank crew, artillerymen, or from other specialties tried working with drones and realized they wanted to master them, so they applied for training. There are many examples of guys who were mobilized as drivers, then became interested, applied for training, trained, and then worked as UAV operators, eventually even becoming instructors.
Of course, technical knowledge is a big plus, it’s a huge advantage if a person understands electronics and has programming skills. But at the core, it all comes down to desire.
Rossa Primavera News Agency: The issue here is a bit different. Many people can be drivers, but learning to program and solder is a very long path. How many hours would it take to learn this, even at a basic level?
KhK: Well, when training a UAV operator for reconnaissance, they specifically teach how to work with Mavics. There is separate training for FPV drones, Orlans, military drones, large reconnaissance drones, and Lantsets, combat drones; these are all separate courses. A person is trained as an FPV drone operator, and they are given the minimum knowledge needed specifically for operating it.
Rossa Primavera News Agency: So, I understand that earlier operators were experts in all related fields, and now this is all separated into specific parts. What distinguishes a reconnaissance operator from an FPV operator? There are large reconnaissance drones, such as wings, DJI systems, strike drones, and then there are those who do payload releases and corrections. What knowledge is needed for those who specialize in these areas?
KhK: Tactically, a reconnaissance operator must be able to use maps, including electronic ones, and mark required objects. Technically, a reconnaissance drone differs from a combat drone in that it is equipped with a camera with high magnification and resolution, which provides a clear image. Kamikaze or payload release drones are equipped with cameras that are pointed forward; these cameras are quite simple and cheap, similar to rearview cameras in cars. The image is sufficient to reach and identify the target but not enough to spot objects at a distance. The zoom on reconnaissance UAVs is very expensive, so reconnaissance drones are always more expensive than combat ones.
As for knowledge, various tactical techniques are taught and emphasized. Certain situations are practiced: moving targets, stationary ones, hidden ones, and others. This is the military’s domain, not the technical side.
Regarding the technical side, there are many areas where the knowledge overlaps. For example, control is based on certain radio signals, all UAVs operate on specific frequencies, but all operators should have a general understanding of the basics.
Rossa Primavera News Agency: As far as you know, Ukraine has created separate UAV operator units. Does Russia need to create such units as well?
KhK: Regarding tactics, I can’t answer whether such units are effective or if we need them. In contrast to Russia, what stands out in Ukraine is the centralization of their operations. They gather data from all operators and create a common database where information on the effectiveness of application, frequencies used by the Russian units, and other data is stored. They collect, store, and pass on this information to the relevant operators.
They also pass this information to the technicians who maintain the drones and their manufacturers. Systematic work gives them a huge advantage. Russia doesn’t have that yet; everything is quite fragmented. There are well-known teams achieving great success, but they operate in a decentralized manner. Separate pilots in different units have varying knowledge, training, and equipment levels. As far as I know, there is no centralized database that coordinates everything at a profound level.
Of course, drone manufacturers, such as Lancet, gather information, contact the pilots directly, and so on. Companies producing drones, whether private or state-owned, collect data, establish communication with one another, but as for doing this on the scale of the entire front, as far as I know, this has not been set up, and this is a major drawback.
In other words, analytics and information that could be useful to different manufacturers are not systematically organized, and nothing is being done about it. ZALA, Russian UAV, and manufacturers of Ural drones, Upyri, know their operators, to whom drones are provided, and receive feedback, but they are not united in a single network.
There is no unified UAV center that analyzes drone use and provides timely recommendations. For example, if the enemy uses a certain frequency, it should be passed on to adjacent units that might not have this information yet. It’s clear that people communicate; there are common chats, but these are private initiatives. Someone finds out something, and they try to share it.
Rossa Primavera News Agency: What do you think, if Russia has such a centralized database, how much of an effect would that have, and how much would it bring Russia closer to victory?
KhK: I think it would definitely increase efficiency – efficiency in drone usage. Because very often, people see a drone in the sky and think: We can also be UAV operators. They call volunteers, somehow learn, and try to apply the drones, sometimes with success, sometimes without.
However, the quality of applying these drones, for instance, those purchased on Aliexpress, sometimes works against the operators. These drones cannot reach the enemy, and their frequency is visible to enemy electronic warfare so that they get targeted.
The operators don’t understand how these systems work, they don’t realize they are detected because they haven’t been taught that. They know that drones are powerful weapons and want to use them, but they lack the knowledge, or they only gather information from the internet. That’s the first point.
The second point is that when EW (electronic warfare) appears, those we work with, they were flying on one frequency for a while, and then they say: Our drones started falling on this frequency. So, they understand the sector where the EW is located and on which frequencies it operates.
And if approached correctly, UAV operators should have a signal intelligence (SIGINT) capability. They must analyze the signal spectrum and understand what type of EW the enemy is using and on which frequencies their drones are flying. Based on this information, operators should plan their operations to know which frequencies to fly their drones. This is a complex task.
Unfortunately, there are specialists who are experts in their field and know more than all of us, but these are isolated groups and they cannot spread their knowledge across the front. There is no system to help them do that – it can’t be done in the open air. Much information circulates via Telegram, but it is unverified and could be disinformation.
There should be a center that collects and analyzes data, providing specific recommendations directly to the troops, so that this becomes a systematic effort. At the moment, everything is fragmented. There are schools that train separately, and manufacturers who collect information – but none of this is connected into a single system. That’s what needs to be done.
In Ukraine, their overseas “partners” have been very helpful when it comes to building this system. They have well-established structures, instructors come over, carry out serious work, test new technologies and solutions, and gather data. This data is used in combat, and the work is organized not at a makeshift level like in Russia, but at the level of inter-unit communications, meaning communication between all combat units.
This is a translation of the interview first published on the Rossa Primavera News Agency website