12.07.2026, Poland.
The matter concerns the upcoming parliamentary elections, which are scheduled for October 2027.
On July 5, 2026, Polish Minister of Defense Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz ordered the declassification of data on military aid to Ukraine for 2022–2026 and instructed the special services to find those responsible for the leak of state secrets. This came amid loud accusations from Deputy Speaker of the Sejm Krzysztof Bosak that the government secretly transferred scarce interceptor missiles for the Patriot air defense systems to Kiev, thereby weakening its own security.
How valuable is this data?
Whether the published data will contain anything unknown to the countries Poland considers as threats (primarily Russia) — that is for the security agencies of the respective states to determine. But most likely, they will be much more interesting to the Polish public and have a greater impact on the political situation in Poland than on the country’s military security.
It is quite possible that they will be published in a controlled manner, with an attempt to find similar blunders in the previous right-wing conservative government. Much in the same way as the secret data published by US President Donald Trump.
However, one should not forget that Poland is a hub through which most of the deliveries to Ukraine passed, so more extensive information may also surface. There is a possibility that the Polish example will prove contagious for other countries, primarily Czechia, Slovakia, and Hungary, which have their own historical scores to settle with the OUN-UPA and where tensions over military supplies to the Kiev regime, which glorifies the Banderites, have long been growing.
It is quite possible that politicians in these countries will become interested in how much their neighbor, who has begun to openly spit in the face of its benefactors, has bled their defenses? Zelensky’s loud, demonstrative gestures have already been noticed not only in Poland but also in Czechia.
Why was this data decided to be declassified?
It can be said that Tusk’s government was led to this step by the pre-election fight of the Polish “bulldogs.” The matter concerns the upcoming parliamentary elections, scheduled for October 2027. The conventionally liberal, pro-European Tusk camp has received a number of major political blows to its rating over the past six months. The government feels vulnerable and is resorting to desperate measures.
First, President Nawrocki broke the unwritten consensus of Polish politics to “overlook” the rehabilitation of Bandera ideology by the Kiev regime for the sake of joint struggle against Russia, and stripped the Ukrainian president of Poland’s highest state award, the Order of the White Eagle. Polish voters had long awaited this, so Nawrocki managed to ride the anti-Ukrainian wave and achieve record ratings. The ice has broken; discussion of this topic can no longer be stopped.
Second, one of the major figures of Tusk’s “Civic Coalition,” the candidate who nearly became president of Poland, losing to Nawrocki by less than 2% — the mayor of Warsaw Rafał Trzaskowski — received a serious political blow due to the scandal with the Southern Hospital in Warsaw. “Suddenly” emerged information that one of the doctors received a considerable sum for providing priority medical care to members of the ruling bloc, leading to the prospect that Trzaskowski may resign in the coming months.
Third, the complete confusion of Tusk and his entourage prevents them from seizing on these topics or responding adequately. They are left with only one strategy: once again use Polish Russophobia and shift the focus from the eastern neighbor to the “Russian threat.“
It is no coincidence that Defense Minister Kosiniak-Kamysz tasked the Military Counterintelligence Service with investigating who purposefully attempted to disclose state secrets on this matter. The minister emphasized that actions against Poland’s national interest threaten the country’s security.
This is most likely an attempt to move from political struggle to legal proceedings, declaring Nawrocki’s supporters as working for Moscow by involving the special services and initiating criminal cases.
How justified is this step?
In the current domestic political situation, this looks weak: the old song about Russophobia is unlikely to withstand the fresh, juicy, previously forbidden theme of “enough feeding Bandera’s Kiev.“
The situation for Tusk’s camp is losing no matter how you look at it: whoever the initiator is, in any case, responsibility for publishing previously classified materials will fall on the current government. Even if the special services “find” “Russian spies” in the opposing camp, they are unlikely to be able to strip them of parliamentary immunity before the elections.
And the “Civic Coalition” will not go for a forceful seizure of power — for this one needs legitimacy. And supporters of direct dictatorship are more likely to be found in Nawrocki’s camp.
Perhaps only an unexpected factor that forces the electorate to unite can save Tusk’s government. For example, something that revives the myth of the “Russian threat.“
It is quite possible that new provocations will be used, as was the case earlier with statements about “Russian drones.” Or external pressure, for example from the United States, will force the Polish camps to work together again.
The question is whether Nawrocki and his entourage will want to play by these rules again.
Source: Rossa Primavera News Agency
