Since May 1, 2026, Russia has officially suspended the transit of Kazakh oil via the northern spur of the Druzhba pipeline to Germany. This may be part of Russia’s preventive strategy by the Russian authorities to halt oil exports to Europe
Since May 1, 2026, Russia has officially suspended the transit of Kazakh oil via the northern spur of the Druzhba pipeline to Germany. This may be part of a preventive strategy by the Russian authorities to halt oil exports to Europe, as announced by the country’s President Vladimir Putin.
Russia’s Strategy
On March 9, 2026, Russian President Vladimir Putin noted that the European Union plans to introduce additional restrictions on the purchase of Russian fossil fuels (including liquefied natural gas) starting April 25, 2026, and that by 2027, Brussels intends to completely stop such imports.
Putin emphasized that “the government has already been tasked with assessing the possibility and feasibility of stopping the supply of our energy resources to the European market, not waiting until the door is demonstratively slammed in our faces, but doing it now and redirecting these volumes from the European market to more interesting destinations, and, most importantly, establishing a foothold there.”
Soon after, rumors spread that Russia planned to stop the transit of Kazakh oil through the northern spur of the Druzhba pipeline. Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Novak confirmed the suspension of transit from May 1, citing “technical capabilities” and limitations.
Germany’s Reaction
Since May 1, 2026, Russia has officially suspended the transit of Kazakh oil via the northern spur of the Druzhba pipeline to Germany.
Germany is already looking for alternative supply routes through the Polish ports of Gdansk and German Rostock. The suspension hits the large PCK Schwedt refinery in eastern Germany, which supplies fuel to up to 90% in Berlin and Brandenburg. Kazakh oil accounted for about 17% of this refinery’s supplies.
The transit suspension occurs at a critical moment triggered by the direct military escalation of the US and Israel against Iran, which began in late February 2026, leading to a de facto blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. The blockade of this critically important maritime corridor has affected about 20% of global crude oil supplies and a significant share of the global liquefied natural gas (LNG) market, creating an acute energy shortage globally. The International Energy Agency (IEA) unequivocally characterized the situation as “the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market.” It also noted that “the current crisis extends well beyond oil, and includes disruptions to natural gas flows, with knock-on effects for electricity security and prices.”
In such macroeconomic turbulence, every alternative fossil fuel supply route gains increased economic and geopolitical significance. For Germany, and especially for the systemically important PCK Schwedt refinery in the federal state of Brandenburg, Kazakh oil, which had been flowing uninterrupted through Russian pipeline infrastructure since 2023, served as an important buffer. This buffer was intended to mitigate the catastrophic consequences of Berlin’s abandonment of direct pipeline and maritime imports of Russian crude.
Statistics show that in 2021 and 2022, Germany received just over 15 million tons of Russian oil annually via the northern branch. The Kazakh supplies that replaced them amounted to only 2.146 million tons in 2025. In the first quarter of 2026, 730 thousand tons of oil were successfully transited.
Germany’s economy has historically rested on energy-intensive manufacturing and the chemical industry. These sectors are now on the verge of shutdown due to destroyed supply chains and explosive growth in raw material prices.
The head of the German Chemical Industry Association (VCI), Wolfgang Grosse Entrup, openly warned of the risk of plant closures, “Even if raw materials can be purchased, their price may become so high that products become uncompetitive. This hits small and medium-sized businesses particularly hard.”
To stop panic at gas stations after the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz began, Berlin restricted dynamic pricing. Authorities allowed gas stations to change prices once per day.
The crisis is exacerbated by the consequences of the harsh winter of 2025–2026, after which gas storage facilities were only 30% full. Germany is forced to spend colossal budget funds on subsidizing energy for households and businesses.
According to the European think tank Bruegel, Germany and Spain currently account for about half of all emergency subsidies allocated in the EU.
Thus, against the backdrop of halted supplies from Russia, the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has become the beginning of a “perfect storm” for Germany: the country is simultaneously facing a shortage of raw materials for industry, the threat of deindustrialization, and the need to spend billions to contain social discontent.
Poland’s Pressure on Germany
Earlier, Poland attempted to drive a wedge between Germany and Kazakhstan over the transit oil supplies to the Schwedt refinery. The Polish pipeline operator analyzed batches of oil from Kazakhstan that arrive at the plant via the Druzhba pipeline (previously, Rosneft’s crude oil went there). It found that the crude oil tramsported to Schwedt was presumably Russian, at least in terms of chemical composition. Polish journalists also discovered with surprise that the Russian company Lukoil is involved in Kazakhstan’s oil and gas projects.
Warsaw has shown interest in purchasing the Schwedt refinery, which is still 54% owned by Rosneft, although it has been placed under the management of the German energy regulator. Poland intends to negotiate the supply of imported oil from the Polish port of Gdansk, but the Germans are in no hurry, as this would lead to a loss of competitiveness and new dependencies in place of the old ones.
Reaction and Actions of Kazakhstan
After news of the transit halt, several Kazakh officials suggested it might be related to attacks on Russian oil infrastructure.
For instance, Kazakhstan’s Minister of Energy Erlan Akkenzhenov stated to journalists on April 22, “Most likely, this is related to recent strikes on Russian infrastructure; I am making this assumption.” He suggested that supplies would resume once technical problems were resolved.
Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy promptly redirected May volumes (260 thousand tons) via alternative routes: 100 thousand tons through the port of Ust-Luga and 160 thousand tons through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) system. These routes have significant spare capacity, allowing them to easily absorb the volumes of oil previously sent to Germany via Druzhba (about 2.5–3 million tons per year).
Thus, Kazakhstan is successfully distributing its oil flows, drawing on its experience from before the transit began in 2023. Meanwhile, Germany is losing supplies of Kazakh oil via Druzhba at a critical moment for itself. It is worth noting that the Russian authorities are still limiting their actions and mostly reacting to the unfriendly actions and sanctions of European countries. At the same time, this example shows that in the fifth year of Russia’s special military operation, the authorities can act more decisively.
Source: Rossa Primavera News Agency
