The failure of Donald Trump and his team does not particularly affect the interests of the so-called US deep state, which not long ago stated that the current vector of globalization does not suit it, as it elevates China to a leading position. And this demand was voiced by Trump supporters
The US-Israel aggression against Iran is smoothly moving into its second phase. The first phase envisaged, by and large, a failed operation to “decapitate” the Iranian leadership, with the expectation of subsequent internal destabilization and the capitulation of the ayatollah regime. Now, when it has become completely clear to everyone that this attempt failed, and that a war of attrition does not frighten Tehran, the stumbling block has become the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, one of the key corridors of global hydrocarbon trade.
US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth stated that navigation through the strait is open, and that only Iranian missiles are causing disruption. President Donald Trump called on tanker captains to be bolder and to just sail through the strait. Despite the apparent recklessness of such appeals, a full blockade of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran is impossible under current conditions. It lacks sufficient resources for mining; bottom mines are poorly suited due to great depths; floating mines must be deployed from ships, and the Iranian fleet has been largely destroyed. Therefore, Iran is incapable of carrying out mining, let alone full patrol operations. On the other hand, escorting tankers through the strait by US warships is also problematic, both due to the insufficient size of the US naval grouping and its vulnerability to Iranian missiles and even artillery. Moreover, even simple short-range missiles, of which Iran has plenty, would suffice.
There is information that the United States is urgently transferring the elite 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, numbering about 2,000–2,500 troops, from the Japanese island of Okinawa to the Persian Gulf. It is possible that the US generals are preparing a limited amphibious operation in Iran, although its prospects are generally doubtful.
What could a landing force achieve on Iranian territory that could not be accomplished by US and Israeli airstrikes? Kidnap high-ranking officials? Iran has already endured the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and a number of senior military figures at the very beginning of the campaign, and this did not break it. Why would it now? Carry out a major act of sabotage at one of Iran’s nuclear facilities? The chances are very low, and the number of US casualties would be very high. Seize Kharg Island, through which the lion’s share of Iran’s oil exports passes? It could be seized, but not held. Moreover, it would be sufficient to damage the infrastructure there to disrupt oil exports from Iran via the island. This does not require special forces.
However, the stakes in this matter are indeed high, and it is not only about oil and gas exports. A shift in the balance of power in the region will inevitably lead to a restructuring not only of the Middle East itself, but of global trade as a whole, and possibly even of the petrodollar system as the economic foundation of US dominance. And to preserve its dominance, a hegemon does not mind sacrificing thousands of marines.
Iran, understanding the strengths and weaknesses of Trump and his team, has put forward very well-thought-out demands. First, to recognize Tehran’s legitimate rights to nuclear (exclusively civilian) and missile programs; second, to pay reparations for the damage inflicted; and third, to provide international security guarantees against future attacks. In essence, Tehran is “only” demanding that its sovereignty be respected.
But not only that. On March 11, the commander of the naval forces of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Alireza Tangsiri, stated that any vessel wishing to pass through the Strait of Hormuz must first obtain permission from Iran. Otherwise, it will be destroyed. The IRGC also stated that, for free passage through these waters, countries must expel US and Israeli ambassadors from their territory.
This is, in essence, Iran’s claim to become a regional hegemon. Iranian missile strikes on US military bases have significantly undermined the US ability to project power in the region, at least in terms of building up a large force for a subsequent ground invasion. Gulf monarchies have also learned firsthand that the presence of US military bases does not protect them from strikes, but rather makes them targets for Iranian attacks. Dubai, for example, has largely lost its reputation as a safe haven, and it is likely that we will soon see not only an outflow of real estate investors but also a departure of financial-sector operators seeking more stable locations, such as Singapore or Hong Kong. If Dubai loses its status as a regional financial hub, along with its ability to attract and circulate petrodollars, it will become an ordinary piece of desert, of no interest even to local camels.
Therefore, Iran’s proposal to expel the USA and continue living more or less as before (with certain reservations) is quite attractive, especially if the United States offers nothing in return except “be patient and endure.” The sheikhs are generally not inclined to endure losses and discomfort without reason.
This proposal also has another important consequence, unpleasant for the United States: it could call into question Arab investments in the US economy—investments that were promised to Trump in amounts approaching a trillion dollars. However, this is more a problem for Trump personally than for the sheikhs.
But the most important issue here is not even the expulsion of the USA from the Middle East, although for Iran this would certainly be a major achievement and open the path to regional dominance. The key point is the demand to switch oil and gas transactions to yuan, which, according to CNN, Iran has put forward. Behind this, as is not difficult to guess, stands China, whose interests Trump sought to undermine by launching this “small harmful war.”
It is also necessary to note a less obvious conflict of interests. For the United States as a hegemon, a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz is advantageous, since it harms both Europe and China. Yes, Russia would also gain short-term benefits, but only because the hegemon cannot deal with all opponents simultaneously. High oil prices and the elimination of discounts for China somewhat cool relations between Russia and China, but this “friendship” should not be overestimated.
The United States, as a hegemon, is interested in weakening Europe, China, and also India, which are heavily dependent on hydrocarbon exports through the strait. As a bonus, this also weakens US allies in Southeast Asia – South Korea, Japan, and Philippines – since such weakening only ties them more closely to the hegemon.
At the same time, the costs of high gasoline prices within the United States and the demonstration of helplessness in failing to defeat a weaker Iran undermine the position of the Trump administration, not the United States itself as a hegemon. Whether US Democrats will win the next US elections is a separate question (most likely yes). But it is already clear that Trump and his team will significantly harm the reputation not only of US Republicans, but of conservatives and supporters of traditional values in general. Additionally, the Epstein case, which will resurface later in the agenda alongside the failed Iranian campaign, will bury the electoral prospects of any US conservative politician.
The failure of Donald Trump and his team does not particularly affect the interests of the so-called US deep state, which not long ago stated that the current vector of globalization does not suit it, as it elevates China to a leading position. And this demand was voiced by Trump supporters. China, for its part, openly declared in World Economic Forum that it is quite satisfied with this globalization. All the maneuvering around Iran and the Strait of Hormuz is an attempt by the deep state to redirect globalization in a direction favorable to itself, using the easily manipulated Trump.
Paraphrasing Joseph Stalin, one might say, “Trumps come and go, but the deep state remains.”
Accordingly, there are three scenarios:
a) a full blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, where Iran allows only its own tankers through,
b) a partial blockade, where Iran allows vessels from certain countries with which it has agreements,
c) a complete unblocking as a result of certain concessions.
The first option suits the real masters of the United States, regardless of how it affects Trump’s reputation. After all, he is already a lame duck. Iran also benefits, as oil revenues rise. However, a full blockade cannot last long, since other players whose vital interests are affected will intervene.
According to Financial Times, France and Italy have entered into negotiations with Iran to ensure safe passage of their vessels through the strait. Earlier, similar negotiations were reported with India. It is worth recalling that France and Italy are not only members of NATO but also part of the US-created security system in the Middle East. However, none of the European countries, including France and Italy, wants to directly participate in the campaign against Iran. French President Emmanuel Macron had previously threatened to ensure escort of ships and unblock the strait, but as we see, he preferred negotiations over military intervention. As for Italy, it never intended to fight.
This means that a new reality is de facto emerging: the security of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz is ensured not by the US military presence, but by its absence and by direct agreements with Iran. Thus, Iran, not the United States, becomes the guarantor of security in the region. And payment for safe navigation will now have to be made to Iran, if the situation develops along this path.
How exactly this “transit fee” will be legally formalized is a separate issue. Yes, this contradicts the declared freedom of navigation, but lawyers will handle it. The more important issue is the precedent it sets: other countries may also want to charge “transit fees” under similar principles. This is not even taking into account the demand to shift oil trade from dollars to yuan, even if this is seen as an initial bargaining position.
Naturally, Saudi Arabia will not be able to ignore such developments and will also want to collect rent and act as a security guarantor. Here, the United States has both the opportunity and the necessity to pit Riyadh against Tehran. And, incidentally, little has been heard lately about the Houthis, against whom Saudi forces once fought persistently but unsuccessfully. It is quite possible that they will re-enter the scene in response to Saudi ambitions.
Time will tell.
This is a translation of the article by Maksim Karev first published in The Essence of Time newspaper, issue 664.
