Italy is cutting back on what voters notice – arms deliveries and participation in military exercises – but is receiving tens of billions from Brussels for rearmament
On August 24, the 35th anniversary of Ukraine’s independence, the leadership of the “coalition of the willing” gathered in Kiev. The new British Prime Minister Andy Burnham who arrived in the Ukrainian capital on his first foreign visit, authorized MBDA to transfer classified documentation on British components of the Storm Shadow missile to Kiev, so that the Kiev regime, together with London and Paris, could accelerate the establishment of its own production of long-range weapons.
French President Emmanuel Macron announced that in October and November large-scale exercises, which are the part of the preparation of Multinational Force Ukraine (MNF-U), would take place. The MNF-U is the very grouping that is supposed to be deployed in the country after a “convincing ceasefire.” European Council President António Costa once again promised to accelerate Ukraine’s accession to the European Union.
Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni participated in the meeting via video link. The Palazzo Chigi’s statement emphasized humanitarian commitments for the winter mentioned in her speech, that is sending additional electrical generators to maintain Ukraine’s energy grid. A few hours later, government sources clarified: Italy would not participate in the exercises.
The Italian “no” to country’s soldiers in Ukraine is not news in itself, Meloni has been repeating it since 2025. But the refusal to participate in exercises is a step of a different order. It is not about sending a contingent to the combat zone, but about practicing a scenario on Polish territory, according to the Italian press. Rome remains within the coalition, continues to sign its communiqués, including the clause on tightening the sanctions regime and combating its circumvention, but withdraws from the operational preparation of that force which France and the UK are building for the post-war period. This is the first time that Rome’s divergence from the coalition’s politics has moved from the realm of declarations to the realm of military planning.
The second symptom is visible only in the numbers. The last, twelfth batch of Italian weaponry went to Ukraine in November 2025. Neither under the government of Mario Draghi nor under Meloni did the pause between shipments exceed six months; now more than nine months have passed. At the same time, as Il Post writes, the Italian Ministry of Defense prepared another package by mid-July, the decision is just not being made. The August 24 communiqué says nothing about weapons: only electric generators.
The scale of Italy’s contribution is already modest. According to the Kiel Institute, over four years Italy has spent about €4.3 billion on support for Kiev, of which €3 billion is military aid, €830 million is humanitarian aid, and €480 million is loans and subsidies. This ranks 12th among 41 Western countries in absolute terms and 24th in terms of GDP (0.24%). For comparison: France’s military spending is €6.2 billion, the UK’s is €15.8 billion, Germany’s is €24.9 billion.
Estimates are approximate: Italy is one of the few Western countries that classifies the nomenclature of military supplies, and sources in the defense ministry speak of a figure of just under €4 billion. Rome has also not joined the US PURL scheme, which allows Europeans to purchase weapons in the United States for transfer to Kiev, and Meloni has not been to Kiev since February 2024.
The reason for the retreat is not a reassessment of the conflict, but electoral arithmetic. A Bidimedia poll from August 26 recorded what the right-wing camp had feared since spring: Roberto Vannacci’s “National Future” (FN) party reached 8% and overtook Forza Italia, becoming the country’s fourth force. Matteo Salvini’s League fell to 4.8%, Brothers of Italy to 25.4%, and the Democratic Party to 21%. The key figure is in coalition scenarios: without Vannacci, the centre-right bloc gets 39.2%, with him – 47.2%, while the “broad field” of the centre-left gets 44.7%. Without the general, the right loses the election. The same poll showed that 32% trust the government, with 64% expressing distrust.
Vannacci built his campaign precisely on the military theme. At the end of July, FN introduced a proposal in parliament to completely stop sending weapons to Kiev; the general himself calls the continuation of supplies meaningless and claims that European money is ruining Ukraine and collapsing the European economy. Politico noted as early as August 10 that support for Ukraine had become Meloni’s vulnerable point, and the prime minister has to justify herself to her own voters.
This position is by no means marginal in the Italian parliament, in various formulations it is shared by the League, the Five Star Movement, the Green-Left Alliance, and part of the Democratic Party. In January, Meloni still allowed herself to mock Vannacci, reminding that he as a general should understand the importance of deterrence. Seven months later, the word “deterrence” has disappeared from her statements, along with any mention of weapons.
But in parallel, literally in the same days, Rome made the opposite move. On August 26, it became known that Italy would still use the European SAFE program, a €150 billion credit mechanism for military investments. Of the €14.9 billion reserved for the country, the government, according to EU sources, requested about €8 billion. Nineteen states submitted applications; Italy and Hungary delayed the necessary documents the longest, and the reason for the delay was internal: for several weeks the ruling parties could not agree on exactly what to take the money for.
Economy and Finance Minister Giancarlo Giorgetti from the League wanted to cover already planned expenditures with loans, while Defense Minister Guido Crosetto demanded that the entire amount be directed to new ones. Deputy from National Future Edoardo Ziello, during the debate, waved a noose in the Chamber of Deputies [lower house of the bicameral Italian Parliament], accusing Giorgetti of putting a “stranglehold on the neck” of the Italian economy, while other FN parliamentarians held up “No SAFE” signs. The loans will still be taken.
The second decision looks far more significant. On August 5, Giorgetti reported to the Chamber of Deputies that the government was launching the procedure for a “national safeguard clause.” This is essentially a Brussels permit to borrow above agreed expenditure ceilings: up to €36 billion over three years, of which 0.9% of GDP, or €21–22 billion, will go to defense, and 0.6% of GDP, about €14 billion, to energy.
The opposition submitted a counter-resolution: to spend this money only on fighting poverty, healthcare, and supporting families and enterprises crushed by rising energy prices, while excluding the military item. The resolution was rejected, and the majority’s text was passed. A schedule is set: European Commission assessment in September, ECOFIN recommendation in October, followed by a parliamentary vote on the budget deviation, which requires an absolute majority.
The backdrop against which this is happening explains both voter sentiment and the prime minister’s caution. After the resumption of hostilities around Iran and disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, European diesel has risen in price by more than 70%, and the August gas price at the TTF hub exceeded €65 per MWh. The Bank of Italy raised its inflation forecast to 3.1% on average for 2026.
Gasoline and diesel at Italian pumps remain above two euros per liter; the CGIA di Mestre research bureau estimates the additional burden on families and businesses at more than €1 billion monthly and over €13 billion annually, with the South – Basilicata, Campania, and Apulia – hit hardest. The OECD forecasts Italy’s GDP growth at 0.5% in 2026, one of the worst figures in the G20. On August 26, the Council of Ministers extended the reduction of the diesel excise tax by 17 cents per liter until September 5. Rearmament, meanwhile, is scheduled until 2028.
Against this backdrop, the debate over sanctions in Italy has ceased to be a debate about foreign policy and turned into a debate about money. On July 16, Salvini spoke in Moscow before Italian entrepreneurs who continue to work in Russia and named the price of the issue: €40 billion in losses for Italian business. He assessed the rejection of Russian gas as follows: it will not bring the end of the war closer, but will hit its own economy. Eni CEO Claudio Descalzi proposed postponing the European ban on Russian LNG, which comes into force on January 1, 2027, and affects 20 billion cubic metres; Meloni rejected this proposal. When agreeing on the latest sanctions package, Rome, together with Paris, sought a softening of visa restrictions. None of this represents a turn toward Moscow: Italy is bargaining for exemptions, without challenging the framework itself.
The result of this week should be formulated without illusions. Italy is not changing camps, it is redistributing costs. Everything the voter sees and remembers – soldiers, exercises, trains with weapons – is being wound down or hushed up. Everything that runs through budget lines and credit agreements with Brussels is growing. The opposition on the right, which shouts loudest about sovereignty, was able to brandish posters and a noose at the time of the SAFE vote, but did not prevent either the loans or the safeguard clause; Italian observers reasonably note that Vannacci’s economic programme repeats the unfulfilled promises of those he criticizes. The direction of military spending does not yet depend on the change of political leaders in the right-wing camp.
In the coming weeks, three points should become important. First and foremost, September 9, when parliament returns to work, and September 20, when the League will gather in Pontida: the party approaches the congress with an open rebellion of northern leaders led by Attilio Fontana and Massimiliano Romeo, who are questioning Salvini’s leadership itself, and loosing its members – former Deputy Defence Minister Raffaele Volpi has already announced the creation of a separate movement.
Secondly, the October vote on the budget deviation. The permit to borrow above ceilings requires an absolute majority of votes, and part of the ruling coalition publicly opposes military spending. Gathering the necessary votes will not be easy.
Thirdly, the MNF-U exercises in October and November. So far, the difference between Rome and the British-French core of the coalition has remained at the level of statements and communiqués. In the autumn, it will for the first time take a form that can be counted: the list of participating countries, the composition of contingents, the training grounds. Italy will not be on that list.
Source: Rossa Primavera News Agency
