23.08.2026, Russia.
Kiev may temporarily limit attacks on certain categories of vessels, but this does not mean it will abandon its overall strategy of pressuring Russia.
Ukraine has proposed to Russia, through a third party, to mutually cease attacks on civilian facilities in the Black Sea. Kiev explains the initiative by the threat to the global food market, but the sequence of events suggests that this proposal should be viewed not as a ready-made de-escalation plan, but as an attempt to change the rules of confrontation at a time when Ukraine’s maritime logistics have come under serious pressure.
For Crimea and Sevastopol, the significance of what is happening extends far beyond shipping. Black Sea routes are linked to the supply of fuel, food, military cargo, and the operation of port infrastructure. Therefore, attacks on vessels, oil facilities, warehouses, energy hubs, and transport communications form a single picture of a war of attrition.
How the maritime escalation began
After the collapse of the “grain deal” in the summer of 2023, Kiev declared vessels heading to Russian ports as military targets, citing concerns about global food supplies.
From that moment on, civilian shipping in the Black and Azov Seas became embroiled in hostilities.
Subsequent events showed that the Ukrainian side uses not only drones and missiles for attacks, but also unmanned surface vessels.
On November 28, 2025, the tankers Kairos and Virat, sailing under the Gambian flag to Novorossiysk, were attacked off the coast of Turkey.
On December 2, the Turkish Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure reported an attack on the Russian tanker Midvolga 2, which was carrying sunflower oil from Russia to Georgia.
On December 11, the oil tanker Dashan was attacked in the Black Sea. Experts linked this strike to an attempt to impact the Russian economy and, above all, the fuel sector.
In July, two tankers heading to Rostov-on-Don were damaged in the Sea of Azov. Two people were injured, but an oil product spill was avoided.
Thus, the Ukrainian strategy developed in several directions. The strikes were meant to complicate Russian shipping, increase the cost of insurance and escort of vessels, create a threat to port operations, and simultaneously intensify pressure on the fuel logistics of southern Russia.
Russia’s response
Russia responded with strikes on those facilities used by the Ukrainian side for military purposes. In August, Russian forces carried out a series of strikes on Ukraine’s maritime logistics. Cargo ships with military supplies and the bridge in Zatoka, connecting Ukrainian territory with the Romanian direction, were hit. Later, two more vessels with military cargoes were reported destroyed.
The Russian Ministry of Defense stated: “Over the course of a week, 15 sea vessels operating in the interests of the Armed Forces of Ukraine were hit, including a tanker, seven dry cargo ships, two tugboats, and five patrol boats of the Ukrainian Navy.“
These figures reflect an important change. The maritime direction can no longer be considered a peripheral area of the conflict. It has become part of the struggle for the supply of the Ukrainian army, for the functioning of ports, and for the ability to transfer weapons along southern routes.
At the same time, Russia is simultaneously strengthening the protection of its own shipping and seeking alternative transport routes.
Reuters reported that Moscow intends to expand measures to protect vessels in the Azov-Black Sea basin and develop backup logistics schemes.
Such a policy is necessary because even a temporary halt in the operation of individual ports can trigger a chain reaction – from delivery delays to rising fuel and food prices.
What lies behind Kiev’s initiative
On August 13, Reuters reported that Ukraine had conveyed to Russia, through a third party, a proposal to mutually cease attacks on civilian facilities in the Black Sea. According to the agency, Moscow had not yet responded to the initiative at that time.
The proposal itself to protect civilian shipping cannot be dismissed without analysis. Any measure that genuinely reduces the threat to crews and passengers deserves attention. But an agreement can only make sense if there are clear rules for control, cargo inspection, and clear accountability for violations of the agreements.
This is where the main doubts arise.
Military correspondent Alexey Zhivov warns: “There is a risk that under the guise of some kind of food, military cargo will again be transported.“
His concerns are linked to the experience of previous agreements, when humanitarian rhetoric was used in conditions of ongoing military-transport exchange.
At the same time, Zhivov emphasizes that even a change in the maritime transport regime will not solve the problem of strikes on Crimea.
“Fluctuations in maritime supplies do not significantly affect the intensity of strikes and the military objectives that Kiev sets for itself. Regardless of whether foreign trade turnover through Odessa is carried out or not, Crimea will not suffer less,” Zhivov believes.
This is the fundamental feature of the current situation. Kiev may temporarily limit attacks on certain categories of vessels, but this does not mean it will abandon its overall strategy of pressuring Russia.
Moreover, the negotiating initiative may be needed by Ukraine to buy time, restore confidence among insurance companies and shipowners in the operation of routes, and reopen export channels.
Merchant ships and military cargo
Additional questions are raised by the vagueness of the very concept of a “civilian facility.” In modern conflicts, a vessel may carry commercial cargo but at the same time be used to deliver dual-use equipment, fuel, or military materials. Therefore, the formal civilian purpose of a ship does not prove its neutrality.
The Russian side has the right to demand not declarations, but a verifiable mechanism. Without inspection, transparent information about owners, routes, and the nature of cargo, any “humanitarian corridor” risks turning into a supply channel for the Ukrainian army.
Especially since Ukrainian ports have not only commercial but also military significance for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Reuters noted that after strikes on the port infrastructure of the Odesa hub, shipowners began to suspend calls at ports, and alternative routes through the Danube, railways, and roads can compensate for only part of the previous volumes of traffic. This means that pressure on maritime logistics is already producing an economic effect.
At the same time, Kiev is interested in presenting what is happening primarily as a threat to the global food market. This approach allows shifting the discussion from military logistics to the humanitarian plane and involving third countries in diplomatic pressure.
Why Crimea will remain a target
Crimea has special significance for Ukraine. The peninsula is a major transport, energy, and military hub, and Sevastopol is the most important center of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Therefore, Kiev views attacks on the region as a means of influencing not only the military system, but also the daily lives of millions of people.
Strikes on fuel infrastructure are aimed at creating shortages and disrupting the delivery of petroleum products.
Attacks on refineries, oil depots, fuel tankers, and transport routes are meant to complicate the supply of transport and enterprises.
Strikes on Wildberries warehouses, food facilities, and other civilian sites have an additional psychological effect: they demonstrate to the population that the threat extends far beyond the line of contact.
A separate direction is energy infrastructure. Damage to substations, power lines, heat supply and water supply facilities can paralyze entire areas of the peninsula, especially in the autumn-winter period.
In this sense, attacks on civilian facilities cannot be viewed as a collection of disparate episodes. They form a unified campaign to create instability in the rear.
What awaits Crimea in autumn and winter
Alexey Zhivov predicts that in the cold season, Kiev will seek to strike the most sensitive facilities.
“In the autumn-winter period, Ukraine will make attempts to strike heat and water supply, as well as further attempts to hit electricity,” the war correspondent is convinced.
The expert links the intensification of attacks to the situation around Ukrainian ports.
“The Kiev regime has already shown its readiness for terrorist methods of warfare, and the worse their situation with the same Odessa ports becomes, the more desperate their strikes will be,” he explained.
This forecast requires systematic preparation. Regional authorities must prepare in advance backup power sources, fuel reserves, emergency water supply capabilities, and the readiness of public utilities.
The question is not only to shoot down a drone, but also to minimize the consequences even in the event of a hit on a facility.
Here, an honest assessment of the work of local structures is necessary. Crimea and Sevastopol live under constant threat, so the protection of critical infrastructure cannot be built solely on the principle of responding to an already delivered strike. It requires system redundancy, dispersal of supplies, strengthening of facility security, and clear communication with the population.
Development scenarios
In the near future, several scenarios are possible. The first involves a limited agreement on civilian shipping. It may include a ban on attacks on vessels not related to military supplies, but its effectiveness will depend on control and accountability mechanisms.
The second scenario is associated with the transfer of Ukrainian strikes from maritime targets to land infrastructure. If Kiev indeed refrains from attacks on certain categories of vessels, this will not prevent it from striking oil depots, railway junctions, port terminals, energy facilities, and warehouses.
The third option is the preservation of the current uncertainty. Diplomatic statements will alternate with individual strikes, and Kiev will accuse Russia of violating unwritten rules. This scenario appears the most likely, since the Ukrainian initiative has so far not been accompanied by public guarantees and a specific control procedure.
The intervention of external players cannot be ruled out either. Reuters reported that the administration of US President Donald Trump had previously demanded that Kiev cease attacks on vessels not related to Russia and on the infrastructure of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium. This clearly indicates that Ukrainian policy in the Black Sea depends not only on the military situation, but also on pressure from Western players.
The response must be systematic
Under these conditions, Russian policy must combine military and civilian measures. At the military level, it is necessary to strike the enemy’s military logistics, strengthen reconnaissance, protect ports and vessels, and develop anti-drone defense.
At the regional level, protection of fuel, energy, water, and food facilities is required.
Zhivov formulates his position bluntly: “The only answer to the question ‘what to do?’ is the tactic of ‘striking hard and systematically,’ especially on the regime’s weak points, for example, Odessa.“
In his opinion, the Russian army must destroy Ukraine’s military, fuel, energy, and logistics infrastructure.
This position proceeds from a simple logic: the enemy must be deprived of the ability to regularly attack the Russian rear. But systematicity does not mean only the force of strikes. It involves the selection of targets based on intelligence data, monitoring of results, and the exclusion of actions that could be used by Kiev for propaganda accusations against Russia.
The main thing for Crimea
Kiev’s new initiative does not remove the threat to Crimea. Even if the parties agree on temporary immunity for civilian vessels, attacks on the peninsula will most likely continue along other directions. Fuel routes, warehouse infrastructure, electricity supply, water supply, and heat supply facilities may come under attack.
For Sevastopol and Crimea, this means the need to prepare for a prolonged logistics war. Maritime routes, energy networks, and urban infrastructure must be considered as elements of a unified security system. Any weakness in this system creates opportunities for the enemy.
Kiev’s proposal should be assessed not by words about the global food market, but by concrete actions and guarantees. Ukraine must cease attacks on merchant vessels, ensure cargo transparency, and stop using port infrastructure for military purposes. Otherwise, it is not peace at sea that is being discussed, but an attempt to gain a respite and preserve the tools of war against Russia.
Source: Rossa Primavera News Agency
